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The causal relationship between educational investments and student outcomes continues
to attract attention. The majority of studies have examined the e®ectiveness of public school
expenditures on student outcomes. This paper attempts to shed light on the impacts of
educational inputs by examining a private educational investment|private tutoring that is
widely employed by South Korean parents as a supplement to public school education. To
deal with the endogeneity of private tutoring expenditures, the paper relies on instrumental
variables (IV) methods, exploiting a student's birth order as a source of identi¯cation. Based
on the IV methods, the paper shows that a 10 percent increase in expenditure leads to a
0.56 percentile point improvement in test score. Such an estimated e®ect is modest and
comparable to the e®ect of public school expenditures on earnings estimated by previous
studies.
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Abstract
The causal relationship between educational investments and student outcomes continues
to attract attention. The majority of studies have examined the e®ectiveness of public school
expenditures on student outcomes. This paper attempts to shed light on the impacts of
educational inputs by examining a private educational investment|private tutoring that is
widely employed by South Korean parents as a supplement to public school education. To
deal with the endogeneity of private tutoring expenditures, the paper relies on instrumental
variables (IV) methods, exploiting a student's birth order as a source of identi¯cation. Based
on the IV methods, the paper shows that a 10 percent increase in expenditure leads to a
0.56 percentile point improvement in test score. Such an estimated e®ect is modest and
comparable to the e®ect of public school expenditures on earnings estimated by previous
studies.
1 Introduction
The causal relationship between educational investments and student outcomes continues to
attract the attention of many. Despite decades of intensive study, there is no general consensus
regarding the e®ectiveness of monetary educational inputs for student outcomes.
In particular, papers that summarize the debate on the e®ects of public school expenditures
often advocate con°icting views. For example, Card and Krueger (1996), Greenwald et al.
(1996) and Krueger (2003) are in favor of the e®ectiveness of public school expenditures; Betts
(1996) and Hanushek (1986, 1997, 2003) cast doubt on the conclusion of these researchers and
suggest several factors that can explain discrepancies in conclusion (e.g., Betts, 1996).
Studies focusing on private schools (e.g., Catholic schools) do not shed much light on the
impacts of educational expenditures as well. Evans and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) show
educational bene¯ts of attending Catholic high school. In contrast, Altonji et al. (2005a), Figlio
and Stone (1999) and Goldhaber (1996) ¯nd no signi¯cant gaps in test scores between public
and private schools. Importantly, many studies on private and Catholic schooling seem to su®er
from lack of reliable exogenous variation for identifying the causal e®ect. Altonji et al. (2005b)
argue that two frequently used instrumental variables|religious a±liation of the parents and
1geographical proximity of Catholic schools|are not a useful source of identi¯cation of Catholic
school e®ect.
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the e®ectiveness of educational investments by
examining private educational expenditures. Speci¯cally, we look into academic e®ects of the
expenditures on private tutoring that is widely employed by South Korean parents in order to
supplement public school education.
In South Korea, secondary school students have little freedom in the choice of their middle
and high schools in a school district. Since 1969 student allocation to public and private schools
has largely been under the strict control of the government, especially in urban regions. Under
this system (labeled `Leveling Policy'), students are basically assigned|not admitted upon
application|to secondary schools within their residential school district by either a pure lottery
or an application-accompanied-by-lottery system under the supervision of the local Ministry of
Education o±ce. Moreover, within school ability grouping is rarely implemented due to the
government's egalitarian policy on secondary education and parents' objections. Curricula are
also controlled by the Ministry of Education nationwide for the most part.
In response to such a rigid public education system, parents in South Korea spend a great
deal of money on private tutoring for their children. According to a statistic, South Korean par-
ents spend on private tutoring 85 percent as much as they spend on public schooling (Korean
Educational Development Institute, Survey on Educational Expenditures, 1998). Given such
large expenditures on private tutoring, many including parents as well as educational policy
makers are concerned about the e®ectiveness of private tutoring on student academic perfor-
mance. From a broader perspective, an examination into the e®ect of private tutoring serves to
illuminate the debates on the impacts of educational inputs on student outcomes.
It is well known that educational expenditures on a student are not exogenously and ran-
domly determined; there is little doubt that private tutoring expenditures are endogenous and
correlated with a student's personal, family and academic characteristics. In the absence of a
randomized experiment on private tutoring, a causal estimation calls for an extra variable for
a student that strongly a®ects the parents' decision to invest in a child's education, but is in-
dependent of educational outcomes of the student (academic performance among others) when
the amount of educational expenditures is controlled for. For such a variable this paper employs
a student's birth order in the family. A large body of literature theoretically and empirically
2documents that parents favor a certain-parity child (e.g., ¯rst-born or last-born) in education.
As long as a student's birth order is exogenously determined by how many older siblings were
born before him or her, however, it is unlikely to a®ect the academic performance of the student.
Using a student's birth order as an IV, this paper shows that a 10 percent increase in private
educational expenditure leads to a 0.56 percentile point improvement in test score. Evaluated
at the mean value, this amount of the e®ect is equivalent to a 1.1 percent increase in test
score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure. Our estimated e®ect of private educational
expenditures is modest and fairly comparable to the e®ect of public school expenditures on
earnings estimated by previous studies (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1996).
Our analysis of private educational expenditures reveals that holding other factors constant,
birth order signi¯cantly in°uences the amount of educational investment for a student: ¯rst-
born students receive signi¯cantly greater expenditures on private tutoring than do later-born
students. Birth order, on the other hand, does not seem to be signi¯cantly associated with a
student's academic performance according to the over-identi¯cation test. Nonetheless, a cor-
relation may exist between a student's birth order and performance along the dimensions that
are not revealed by statistical tests. We, however, expect such a correlation to be more likely
to overstate the true e®ect than understate it; thus our IV estimates can be interpreted as the
upper limit of the e®ect of private tutoring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents various theories and empirical
evidence on the relationship between birth order, educational investments and outcomes. Section
3 gives a description on private tutoring in South Korea. Data are discussed in section 4; the
empirical strategy in section 5. Empirical results are shown in section 6. Potential explanations
for the small e®ect of private tutoring are reviewed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Birth Order, Educational Investments and Outcomes
2.1 Various Theories
The phenomenon and reasons for parental favor for a certain-parity child in educational invest-
ment have been reported in a number of studies. First, studies suggest priorities in education
for ¯rst-born and last-born children. The resource dilution model in sociology and the quan-
tity/quality tradeo® model in economics argue that parents are faced with time and ¯nancial
3constraints over the life cycle. This makes it impossible to equalize resources over children
(Behrman, 1988; Birdsall, 1991; Horton, 1988). First-born and last-born children will bene¯t
because they enjoy more quality time and monetary resources with less competition than do
middle-born children.
Second, other scenarios are possible when the availability of a family's ¯nancial and time
resources is important to a child. Parents may invest more in educating later-borns than earlier-
borns, if parents' earnings increase over their life cycle (Parish and Willis, 1993; Powell and
Steelman, 1995). And later-born children may bene¯t from more parental attention, if earliest-
born children have moved out of the family's home.
Third, parental preferences may vary by birth order (Behrman and Taubman, 1986). If
parents seek their security in old age, they may favor earlier-born children (especially, sons) and
devote greater resources to them, as they become economically independent ¯rst. If parents
are focused on their career, however, they may be willing to spend less time and more money
on their children when parents are younger than when they are older and more established
professionally.
Besides the birth order e®ects on educational investments in children, there are also several
potential channels through which a di®erent-parity child may have di®erent academic capability
and intelligence that are either endowed or developed over time.
A natal factor may play a formative role in a child's academic capability. Children of higher
birth order (i.e., younger siblings) naturally have older mothers, and older mothers tend to have
children of lower birth weight. This will give the oldest children an advantage (Behrman, 1988):
the intellectual capability declines with birth order. The intrahousehold allocation of resources
in early childhood may also contribute to later di®erences in a child's capability among siblings,
since early nutritional and health status are known to a®ect children's educational outcomes
such as IQ (Behrman, 1988; Horton, 1988).
A theory in psychology predicts that younger children have worse intelligence than older
siblings. The `con°uence theory' (Zajonc, 1976) argues that there exist birth order e®ects
on intelligence that are favorable for older and unfavorable for younger siblings, because the
average intellectual environment of the home deteriorates when a higher proportion of household
members are young children.
Independent of the natal and early resource allocation factors, the optimal fertility-stopping
4rule can give rise to birth order e®ects. When parents employ the optimal childbearing rule
where they make fertility decisions based on the quality of the prior-born child, the youngest
children tend to have an extreme quality|either worst or best (Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004): if
parents stop having children when they have a child with lower (higher) than expected genetic
endowments, then the last-born child has the lowest (highest) quality.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Although there are many empirical studies on birth order e®ects, they often confound educa-
tional investment by parents with the own quality of a child.1 Typically, studies on birth order
e®ects examine educational attainments (such as completed years of education, college atten-
dance, high school graduation, private school attendance and test scores), and sometimes labor
market outcomes (such as a full-time employment and earnings), not separating the amount of
pure investment on a child by parents from the own capability of the child. Therefore, empirical
evidence on the independent e®ects of birth order on parents' educational investment and on
a child's own quality is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, a trend (albeit arguable) reported by
studies is that birth order a®ects parental allocation of resources that presumably in°uence ed-
ucational attainment, but it has no signi¯cant (or consistent) e®ects on a child's capability such
as intellectual development and the performance in schools and the labor market (Steelman et
al., 2002).2
Behrman and Taubman (1986) ¯nd empirical evidence that lower birth order or ¯rst-borns
are favored in schooling, while there exist no statistically signi¯cant birth order e®ects on
earnings for young U.S. adults. Powell and Steelman (1995) ¯nd that later-born children are
more likely to be the bene¯ciaries of educational resources and receive ¯nancial assistance in
college. Hauser and Sewell (1985), however, show no signi¯cant or systematic e®ects of birth
order on schooling outcomes (high school graduation, postsecondary educational attainments
1Empirical analyses of birth order e®ects are also frequently complicated by the presence of independent sibship
size e®ects. While birth order e®ects are more or less neglected in theoretical discussions, economic theories on
sibship size e®ects have a long tradition and extensive empirical support in the name of a quantity/quality
tradeo® (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Recent evidence, however, suggests that the e®ects of sibship size on a child's
educational attainment may proxy for those of birth order. Black et al. (2005) show that a negative correlation
between sibship size and children's education becomes negligible when birth order is added as an explanatory
variable along with sibling size. See also Angrist et al. (2005) and Conley and Glauber (2005) for a causal analysis
of the e®ects of sibship size in consideration of birth order.
2In psychology, although Sulloway (1996) argues for the presence of birth order e®ects, recent views seem to be
that birth order has no signi¯cant e®ects on personality and psychological characteristics (Harris, 1998; Pinker,
2002).
5of those graduates, or educational attainments). Recently, Black et al. (2005) document that
for every sibship size up to 10 ¯rst-born children have signi¯cantly higher years of completed
education than later-born children do. They also report that ¯rst-born children have greater
earnings, higher probability of full time employment and lower probability of teen childbearing
than later-borns. Interestingly, they suggest that much of the birth order e®ect on earnings is
likely to work through education (p.695).
Empirical evidence on birth order e®ects on children's endowed qualities and academic ca-
pability is more or less mixed. On the one hand, Zajonc (1976) and Zajonc and Mullally (1997)
report intellectual test performance declines with birth order. Hanushek (1992) ¯nds that while
there is no birth order e®ect among small families with less than 5 siblings, in large families
test scores are higher among last-born and ¯rst-born children than among middle-borns. On
the other hand, Retherford and Sewell (1991) and Rodgers et al. (2000) ¯nd no evidence of
birth order e®ects on intelligence. Olneck and Bills (1979) and Blake (1981) report that there
exists a negligible in°uence of birth order on individuals' educational attainment and test scores.
Kessler (1991) presents that birth order fails to signi¯cantly in°uence the level or growth rate
of wages.
To summarize, the existing evidence about the e®ects of birth order on educational invest-
ment and outcome measures is mixed. Yet, research shows a trend that birth order matters
to educational investment, while having negligible (or inconsistent) impacts on a child's aca-
demic performance. More importantly, existing empirical evidence is inherently limited because
studies often confound the pure educational investment with the own quality of a child. Given
the limitations of existing evidence, the validity of a child's birth order as an IV for private
educational expenditures seems to be a matter to be resolved empirically in the context of our
main analysis.
3 Private Tutoring in South Korea
There are potentially many forms of private tutoring that a student may receive for various
reasons. It varies from a swimming lesson for an exercise to math tutoring for a slow-learning
child. Here we focus our attention on a private supplementary instruction of academic subjects
that involves ¯nancial transactions outside the formal school system. Such private tutoring is
6generally observed in many countries where public education system is poorly equipped or the
existing system fails to satisfy highly motivated parents. While it is apparently most prominent
in East Asian societies such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea (Time Asia, 2006),
studies report private tutoring in a wide range of countries from Egypt, Kenya to India, Roma-
nia, Canada and UK (Baker et al., 2001; Bray, 1999).
In South Korea there exist widespread and large-scale markets for private tutoring outside
the public education system. For example, Ministry of Education (1999, 2000) reports that
about 58.2 percent of all pre-college students experience various kinds of private tutoring in 2000.
It also documents that such a proportion is highest (70.7) among elementary school students,
medium (59.5) among middle school students, and relatively low (46.8) among college-bound
students of general high school. As a consequence of widespread popularity, private tutoring
expenditures by parents are also quite large in Korea. Ministry of Education (1999, 2000)
shows that private tutoring expenses are about 9 percent of incomes of the households that have
school-aged children for all income groups. At the national level, total household expenditures
on private tutoring of year 2003 amount to 2.3 percent of the national GDP and 55 percent of
the national annual budget for public education (Korean Educational Development Institute,
Media Brie¯ng, November 19, 2003). A major reason for such widespread private tutoring in
the country is that there are virtually no private secondary schools that are independent of the
government's control: in Korea private middle and high schools are little di®erent from public
schools with respect to school administration, curriculum and student placement, because they
are heavily subsidized and controlled by the government.3
Among potentially many channels of private instruction, only two broad types of private
tutoring are permitted by the government and practiced in the market in Korea. One is a rela-
tively formal instruction o®ered by hakwons|private for-pro¯t school-like learning institutions.
The other is an informal private instruction by individual university students. All other forms
of private tutoring including private instruction by full-time school teachers outside the school,
that by hakwon instructors outside the hakwon, and private tutoring through mails, phones and
TVs are prohibited by the government. Of these two legal forms of private tutoring, the govern-
ment maintains a strong control over hakwons, while it has little control over individual tutors:
3For an overview of secondary education and private tutoring in South Korea, see Kim and Lee (2001) and
OECD (1998).
7the government imposes some requirements for establishing a hakwon, and exerts administrative
controls with respect to pricing, academic quali¯cation of tutors, physical facilities, etc. (Kim
and Lee, 2001)
According to our data from the Korean Education and Employment Panel (discussed shortly),
the proportion of grade 11 students who receive private tutoring for any subject is 77.8 per-
cent. And their overall average monthly spending on private tutoring is about KRW 285,400|
approximately USD$239, which amounts to 9 percent of monthly family income (see Table 1).
Among academic subjects, private tutoring is most frequently practiced for mathematics (51.8
percent). Of those students who receive private tutoring for math, 45.4 percent uses hakwons
and 47.4 percent employs one-to-one or one-to-many tutoring o®ered by individual tutors.
4 Data
4.1 Description of the Main Sample
For empirical analysis this study employs the Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP).
KEEP is a longitudinal study that is conducted from year 2004 by the Korea Research Institute
for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET)|a government-funded research institute.
The basic structure of KEEP follows the National Educational Longitudinal Studies (NELS) of
the U.S. The beginning cohorts of KEEP consist of 6,000 students from three di®erent popu-
lations: 2,000 students each from middle school (grade 9), general high school and vocational
high school (both grade 12, the ¯nal year of secondary education). Students of each group are
sampled by the strati¯cation method to re°ect the national population of the group. More
speci¯cally, for each group 100 schools are selected in consideration of the regional distribu-
tion of schools and students. For each school 4 di®erent classes are randomly chosen, and for
each class 5 students are sampled at random. The sampled students are administered a va-
riety of personal, family and school-related questionnaires. In addition, students' homeroom
teachers, school principals and parents are separately surveyed to collect a range of background
information on the sampled student.
An important feature of the KEEP data is that the survey collects detailed information on
a student's private tutoring experience and expenditures, and the sibling composition from the
parent questionnaire. It enables us to construct main explanatory variables and instrumental
8variables of this study. Also unique in the KEEP data is the availability of the College Scholastic
Ability Test (CSAT) scores for high school graduates. CSAT is the national college-entrance
examination of Korea that is annually administered under the supervision of the Ministry of
Education and whose scores are used as an important factor by colleges and universities to
determine the admission of the applicants. Using the resident registration number of the student,
the KEEP data are linked to the administrative data base of the 2004 CSAT scores for the test
writers. As a measure of a student's academic performance, we employ the CSAT percentile
scores of the following three subjects: the Korean language, mathematics, and English.4 The
percentile score of each individual subject ranges from 0 (lowest score) to 100 (highest score).
Given the percentile score of each subject, the average of the three individual percentiles is
calculated and employed for our main analysis.
Although vocational high school graduates are eligible for CSAT, the majority of the CAST
writers are general high school graduates; they are also the majority of students taking private
tutoring. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the general high-school sample of 2,000 students.5
For main analysis, the original general high-school sample has been further narrowed down.
First, those students whose guardian is not one of the parents are excluded from our main
sample. Patterns of private educational investment and academic performance among these
students may be far from typical due to the absence of both parents. A total of 85 students
are removed from the original sample as their guardian is either a grandparent, sibling, or close
relatives. Students from single-parent families, however, are retained.
Second, students are excluded from the main sample if they either attend a special high
school for music, ¯ne arts and athletics, take private tutoring to major in these subjects for
higher education in universities, or both. Tutoring costs among them are generally much greater
than costs of a normal tutoring of academic subjects. And these students are likely to be poor
performers in such a general subject test as CSAT.6 The number of such students are 168 in
4Guidelines of CSAT stipulate that students are free to choose individual subjects for their examination.
Nevertheless, the majority of students choose either Korean, mathematics, English or all, because they are
required by many universities for application. Out of a national total of 574,218 CSAT writers in 2004, 98.9
percent select Korean, 87.8 percent mathematics, 99.3 percent English, 34 percent science and 59.1 percent social
studies (Korea Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation (KICE), Media Brie¯ng in December, 2004). In the KEEP
data set, 98.2 percent of a total of 1,733 CSAT writers in 2004 choose Korean. The corresponding ¯gures are
89.6 and 98.0 percent for math and English, respectively.
5For 2004 general high school accounts for 70.5 percent of 1.75 million high school students in the nation;
vocational high school accounts for the remainder (Yearbook of Educational Statistics 2004, National Statistical
O±ce).
6According to the KEEP data, students who attend special high schools for music, ¯ne arts and athletics
9total.
Since more than one restriction may be applied to a single student, the preceding two
restrictions leave a total of 1,752 students for further analysis. Descriptive statistics of the main
sample and their di®erences between ¯rst-born and later-born students are documented in Table
1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Among CSAT test-writers, the mean percentile score of the Korean language is 49.8; the mean
scores of math and English are 49.0 and 49.4, respectively.7 While mean math score is close
between the two groups, mean scores of Korean and English among ¯rst-borns signi¯cantly
exceed those of later-born students. And the mean of the percentile scores averaged over the
three subjects is also signi¯cantly greater for ¯rst-born than for later-born students. Yet it
is not clear whether these di®erences between the two groups are endowed by birth order or
created by contemporary variations in educational investment.
As for the amount of spending on private tutoring, ¯rst-born students receive larger edu-
cational investments from their parents than later-born counterparts do.8 While the overall
average monthly spending on private tutoring is about W285,400|approximately $239, the
average spending for ¯rst-born students (W323,800) is 35 percent greater than that for later-
borns (W240,500). This amount of gap is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The proportion of
or take private tutoring of these ¯elds expend a monthly average of W513,000|approximately $430. Other
students, on the other hand, spend nearly half as much on private tutoring|a monthly average of W285,000. In
addition, the average CSAT scores are substantially di®erent between these two groups of students. The average
percentile score of the arts and atheletic students is 31.3; that of the non-specialist group is 48.3. The di®erence
is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
7The following procedure is employed to construct the CSAT scores of analysis from the raw CSAT percentile
scores: In the KEEP data, there exist students who do not apply for the 2004 CSAT. In addition, some students
are absent for a few or all subjects of the examination upon application. We consider a student to have no
intention of writing the 2004 CSAT, and treat the CSAT scores as unknown and missing, if the student either
does not apply for the 2004 CSAT, or is absent (upon application) for the tests of all three main subjects (Korean,
math, and English). If a student misses the test of only one or two subjects and is present for other subjects, on
the other hand, the student's CSAT score for the missed subject is set to zero, not missing. (There are 6 students
with a zero score for Korean, 4 for math, and 7 for English.) Those who, according to the preceding criteria, are
considered as non-writers of the 2004 CSAT account for a total of 235 students|13.4 percent of students in the
main sample. In section 6.4, we attempt to take those non-writers of CSAT into consideration. Up to such a
point, our main analysis does not include those who miss all the three tests and have their test scores unknown.
8The KEEP survey asks the monthly average amount of overall expenditures on private tutoring during the
last six months before grade 12|roughly nine to fourteen months prior to the CSAT test.
10those who have ever received private tutoring|those with positive monthly spending|is also
far higher among ¯rst-born students (83.0 percent) than among later-borns (71.6 percent).
When tutoring experiences are focused on the three main subjects, math is the subject for
which students most likely take private tutoring (51.8 percent); it is followed by English (41.0
percent) and Korean (30.1 percent) in frequency. Weekly tutoring hours are also longest for
math (2.5 hours), followed by English (1.7 hours) and Korean (1.3 hours) in terms of duration.
Whether in terms of frequency or duration, the preceding statistics suggest that ¯rst-born
students receive signi¯cantly greater educational investments than later-borns do.
Using the questionnaire for grade-12 homeroom teachers, we create a measure of a student's
pre-tutoring performance. This measure is important to our analysis, since it reveals pre-existing
di®erences in student quality before the treatment (i.e., private tutoring). The teachers are asked
to report a student's approximate rank from 0 (lowest quality) to 100 (highest quality) within
a school or a classroom during the second semester of grade 11.9 According to this measure,
students are on average rated to have a medium pre-treatment quality (46.1 percentile). Later-
borns have a pre-treatment quality slightly higher than ¯rst-born students. The di®erence,
however, is indistinguishable from zero. Weekly hours of self-study excluding private tutoring
hours are also similar between ¯rst-borns (11.6 hours) and later-born students (11.0 hours). The
preceding statistics indicate that there seem to exist no substantial di®erences in pre-treatment
quality and self-investment in study between ¯rst-born and later-born students. Parents, on the
other hand, invest more intensively in ¯rst-born than in later-born children.
A student's age, sex, presence of both parents and school characteristics do not vary sub-
stantially between ¯rst-born and later-born students. The average age of parents of ¯rst-borns is
lower than that of later-borns, since a couple gives birth to the ¯rst child earlier in life. The par-
ents' average education level and family monthly income is higher among ¯rst-borns than among
later-born students. This re°ects a tendency that better-educated (hence higher-income) people
get married, give birth to a ¯rst child later in life and have fewer o®springs (Rosenzweig, 1986).
9Because of the Korean government's traditional leveling policy in secondary education, ability mixing is
widely applied in Korean high schools. As a result, a student's rank will not vary substantially, whether an entire
school or a single classroom is employed as a reference group for ranking students. We do not attempt to convert
the ranks reported by grade-12 homeroom teachers across the school and class levels, since there is no su±cient
information to support objectively this conversion in the KEEP data set.
As the KEEP survey collects information on private tutoring during the second semester of grade 11 (as
mentioned in footnote 8), an assumption required in our analysis is that it takes some time for private tutoring to
take e®ect in a student's performance. Otherwise, our measure of a student's pre-treatment quality is error-ridden,
because it contains part of short-term e®ects of private tutoring.
11In our main sample, 53.9 percent is ¯rst-born students that include only children. 31.1 percent
is ¯rst-born boys; 22.8 percent is ¯rst-born girls. In the sample, only children account for 7.5
percent; the mean number of siblings in a family is 2.2 and the maximum is 6.10
5 Empirical Framework
For our empirical analysis we consider a value-added model of educational production given by:
Yi = ¯0 + Ti¯1 + ~ Yi¯2 + Xi¯3 + ui (1)
where Yi is the (average) percentile test score of student i; Ti is the monthly spending on tutoring
for i (in natural log)11; ~ Yi is i's pre-tutoring performance in grade 11; Xi is the vector of i's
personal and family backgrounds as well as school characteristics; and ui is the random error
term.
Estimating this model by OLS may fail to yield a causal and consistent estimate for ¯1,
because of the endogeneity problem (i.e., E(Tiui) 6= 0). For example, if educationally-motivated
families spend more on private tutoring and these families are not appropriately measured, the
estimate for ¯1 is likely to be biased upward. And if parents determine the expenditure on
private tutoring according to the pre-tutoring performance of the child, then the estimate can
also be biased: if parents tend to spend more on lower performers and less on higher performers,
the estimate will be biased downward; if parents spend less on lower performers and more on
higher performers, the estimate will be biased upward.
In order to deal with such an endogeneity problem, we estimate (1) by IV methods. The
¯rst-stage model for private tutoring expenditures is speci¯ed as follows:
Ti = °0 + Firsti°1 + ~ Yi°2 + Xi°3 + ²i (2)
10In the empirical analysis we include only children and control for their status with a dummy variable.
Excluding them from the sample does not yield qualitative di®erences in results.
11In order to minimize outlier problems and make the interpretation convenient, the raw values of tutoring
spending are converted into the natural log metric. And the log-transformed values are multiplied by 10 in order
to examine the changes in Yi associated with 10 percent changes in tutoring spending. To deal with zero spending
in the log transformation, a value of 10 is added to every student's raw value of tutoring spending. The value
of 10 is used since it is the smallest positive unit of money reported in the survey (W10,000) and it is about
3.5 percent of the mean expenditure on private tutoring. Whether a smaller value (e.g., 1) is added to every
expenditure or the level of raw values are employed rather than the log, the results are qualitatively similar.
Appendix Table 1 reports estimates under the two di®erent measures of the expenditure.
12We use two sets of variables for the ¯rst-born indicator Firsti. One set is a dummy variable
that takes 1 if i is a ¯rst-born child in the family and 0 otherwise regardless of the sex. The
other set consists of two dummy variables: ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators. The
reference group is the group of later-born boys and girls. Given that Korean parents show son
preference (Park and Cho, 1995), educational investments may vary between ¯rst-born son and
¯rst-born daughter. In addition, the second set of Firsti enables us to test more formally the
exogeneity of birth order by means of the over-identi¯cation test.12
Although the over-identi¯cation test sheds light on potential exogeneity of birth order to ui,
failure to reject the null hypothesis does not necessarily imply the IV is exogenous. As discussed
in section 2.2, some studies report birth order e®ects on academic capability such as IQ, though
their presence remains controversial. Furthermore, given that parents favor a certain-parity
child (e.g., ¯rst-born) over others with respect to observable educational investments, it is
possible that they may favor the same child along unobservable dimensions, too: for example,
while spending more money on tutoring for the ¯rst-born, parents may provide better emotional
and non-¯nancial supports for the ¯rst-born than for other siblings. If this is the case, our IV
estimates will be biased. Nevertheless, we expect such a bias to be more likely to be upward
than downward.
There are three reasons for this expectation. First, if parents favor, say, the ¯rst-born with
respect to monetary educational investments, they will tend to support the same child more
over unobservable dimensions as well; thus a correlation between the ¯rst-born indicator and ui
is more likely to be positive than negative.13 Second, studies reporting signi¯cant birth order
12This method of creating an overidenti¯ed model is similar to that of Angrist and Evans (1998). In an
estimation of causal e®ects of sibship size on women's labor supply, they introduce a mixed sibling-sex composition
as an IV for sibship size. To produce an overidenti¯ed model they decompose the same sex instrument into two
boys and two girls indicators.
13In a simple model expressed by y = ¯0 +¯1x+u, if x is endogenous and z is a potential IV, the IV estimator
for ¯1 is given by b ¯IV =
Cov(y;z)
Cov(x;z), whose probability limit is equal to ¯1 +
Cov(u;z)
Cov(x;z). Thus, given that Cov(x;z) is
positive, the direction of bias in b ¯IV is determined by the sign of Cov(u;z).
In the KEEP data there are not many variables available by which we can examine such unobservable supports
of parents for a certain-parity child. Nevertheless, we attempt an indirect method to address how di®erently
parents treat a ¯rst-born child relative to other siblings by focusing on early childhood. Using the information
on how often parents read books to a child in pre-school period (1 if very often and 0 otherwise) and how
often they help the child's homework and examination in elementary school period (1 if very often or often
and 0 otherwise), we run linear probability models in which the student's personal and family backgrounds are
controlled for together with the ¯rst-born indicator. The results show that parents more often read to a ¯rst-born
child in pre-school period (coe±cient 0.125; SE 0.027), and help the ¯rst-born child's homework and examination
in elementary school period (coe±cient 0.073; SE 0.029). In addition, parents have greater educational aspiration
for a ¯rst-born child (a post-graduate degree as opposed to a university degree or below) than for other siblings
(coe±cient 0.052; SE 0.026).
13e®ects on intelligence usually show negative rather than positive e®ects of birth order: older
siblings have higher intelligence than younger siblings. Thus there will be a positive if any
correlation between the ¯rst-born indicator and ui. Third, according to Table 1, the average
education and family income of parents are higher among ¯rst-borns than among later-born
students. Although our regressions control for parents' education and income, they may not
fully capture a potential association between birth order and ui. To the extent that parents
of higher education and income tend to a®ect positively a child's performance, we also expect
the correlation between the ¯rst-born indicator and ui to be positive rather than negative.
Therefore, given that ¯rst-borns are favored in private tutoring expenditures, as empirically
found later, using the ¯rst-born indicator as an IV is more likely to overstate the e®ect of
private tutoring expenditures than understate it.14 Our IV estimates can be viewed as the
upper limit of the e®ect of private tutoring.
In addition to the potential exogeneity of an IV, weak IVs have been another major concern in
IV estimations. It is now well-known that if instruments are weak, then the sampling distribution
of a conventional 2SLS estimator is nonnormal; standard 2SLS point estimates, hypothesis tests,
and con¯dence intervals are unreliable. According to a criterion proposed by Stock et al. (2002,
Table I) for a single endogenous variable, a single IV is weak if the ¯rst-stage F statistic is less
than 8.96; two IVs are jointly weak if the F statistic is less than 11.59. In the face of potential
weakness of our IV, we employ two standard sets of methods for point estimation and testing
that are robust to the presence of weak IVs.15
The ¯rst set is three testing methods that are fully robust to weak IVs: the Anderson-Rubin
(AR) test (Anderson and Rubin, 1949), the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test (Kleibergen, 2002),
and the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test (Moreira, 2003). Based on the test statistic
of each test, we construct the 95 percent con¯dence interval for testing. The second set is two
point estimation methods that are partially robust to weak IVs: Limited-Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) and Fuller-k estimator with ® = 1 (Fuller, 1977). Unlike 2SLS estimators,
14An optimal fertility-stopping rule (Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004) may imply either downward or upward bias in
our IV estimates of ¯1. For example, if parents stop fertility when an above-average quality child is born and they
invest more on the less endowed ¯rst-born, then we observe higher tutoring expenditures on the ¯rst-born and
downward bias in the IV estimates of ¯1; on the other hand, if parents stop fertility when a below-average quality
child is born and they invest more on the more endowed ¯rst-born, then we observe higher tutoring expenditures
on the ¯rst-born and upward bias in the IV estimates of ¯1. Empirical evidence on fertility-stopping rule and its
connection with educational investment is, however, scarce.
15There are several survey papers on the IV estimation under weak IVs: Andrews and Stock (2005), Dufour
(2003), Hahn and Hausman (2003) and Stock et al. (2002).
14conventional normal asymptotic approximations can be applied to these two estimators for
inference and testing.
6 Estimation Results
6.1 OLS and IV Results
6.1.1 Reduced-form Results by OLS
Basic OLS results of the e®ect of private tutoring expenditures on student performance are
presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. The associations between tutoring expenditures
and percentile test scores (averaged over the three main subjects) are positive but quite small,
although signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. A 10 percent greater monthly expenditure on pri-
vate tutoring is related to no more than a 0.1 percentile point higher test score. As explained
previously, such an association that is estimated by OLS may not be consistent and causal. De-
pending on the correlation between Ti and ui, the estimate may be biased upward or downward.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.
In column (2) being a ¯rst-born child is not strongly related with higher test scores, even
if there is a positive connection. Although examining the signi¯cance of the e®ect of being
¯rst-born in an OLS framework is not a formal test for the validity of birth order as an IV|
the consistency of the estimated e®ect of being ¯rst-born depends crucially upon exogeneity of
private tutoring expenditures, this ¯nding is suggestive of the possibility that birth order can
be exogenous to ui in (1).
As for other explanatory variables, higher pre-tutoring performance leads to higher post-
tutoring test scores. Single-fatherhood (relative to the presence of both parents) and parents'
average education level are signi¯cantly related to the test score of a student. In contrast, single
motherhood, the number of books at home, family income and parents' average age are not
associated with test scores. While a student's age have a strong connection with test scores,
sex, being an only child and the number of siblings fail to have a signi¯cant bearing with test
scores.
156.1.2 First-stage Results
The results of the ¯rst-stage regression of tutoring expenditures are presented in columns (3) and
(4) of Table 2. In column (3), being ¯rst-born signi¯cantly and positively a®ects private tutoring
expenditures for a student. First-born students receive about 30 percent greater expenditures
on tutoring than later-born students. (Recall that a log of a monthly tutoring expenditure is
multiplied by 10. See footnote 11.) The F statistic for the ¯rst-born indicator is 12.9. According
to a criterion of Stock et al. (2002), whether a student is ¯rst-born is a strong|or not-weak|
IV for tutoring expenditures for the student. Provided that being ¯rst-born has no direct
association with test scores, this variable can serve as a legitimate instrument for spending on
tutoring.
When the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators are employed as IVs, the amount of
spending for ¯rst-born boys is about 26 percent greater, and that for ¯rst-born girls is about
34 percent greater than that of later-borns. Although parents appear to spend more for ¯rst-
born girls than for ¯rst-born boys relative to later-borns, di®erence in size between them is not
signi¯cantly larger than zero (p-value>0.1). While the individual signi¯cance di®ers between
the two IVs, the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators are jointly signi¯cant predictors of
educational expenditures. In column (4) the F statistic for the joint signi¯cance of these two
variables is 6.59; the p-value is less than 0.001. According to Stock et al. (2002), however, the
two IVs fail to be jointly su±ciently strong so that conventional 2SLS inference and testing
methods can be applied. Thus, the over-identi¯ed case calls for estimation and testing methods
that are robust to weak IVs.
Tutoring expenditures show an inverted-U shape relationship with a student's pre-tutoring
performance. While parents spend signi¯cantly more on students with medium-low prior per-
formance (the 25th to 50th percentiles) than on those with the lowest prior performance (below
the 25th percentile), the expenditure starts to fall as the level of prior performance rises above
the 50th percentile. If a linear term of prior performance is used rather than dummies, the
relationship is negative, though not signi¯cant|negative 0.011 (SE 0.016). This inverse rela-
tionship between pre-tutoring performance and tutoring expenditures suggests that the OLS
estimates of ¯1 in (1) are more likely to be biased downward than upward, because parents
seem to spend educational funds for siblings in a compensating way.
16Other variables, which signi¯cantly a®ect expenditures on private tutoring, include the num-
ber of siblings and the variables re°ecting a family's economic strength such as family income
and parents' average education level. The negative relationship between sibship size and tutor-
ing expenditures is consistent with a quality/quantity tradeo® in fertility.16 In contrast, hours
of self-study, single-parenthood, the number of books at home, parents' age and a student's
age, sex and only-child status do not have a strong association with the amount of tutoring
expenditures.
6.1.3 Second-stage Results
The IV estimates of the e®ect of tutoring expenditures are shown in columns (5) and (6) of
Table 2. The estimates in column (5) are based on the ¯rst-born indicator as an IV, while
those in column (6) on the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators as IVs. Estimates from
weak-IV-robust estimation and testing methods are also reported at the bottom.
According to 2SLS estimates, a 10 percent increase in expenditure enhances a student's
performance by 0.54-0.56 percentile points. Evaluated at the mean percentile score (49), they
imply a 1.1 percent increase in test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure on private
tutoring. The LIML and Fuller-k estimates imply that a 10 percent increase in expenditure
leads to a 0.51-0.56 percentile point improvement in test score. Tests based on weak-IV-robust
methods, however, suggest that the estimated e®ects are statistically indistinguishable from
zero. All the 95% con¯dence bands of three weak-IV-robust testing methods contain zero.
Although they are statistically indistinguishable from zero, our IV estimates are over 5
times greater than the OLS estimates. This implies that the OLS estimates are severely biased
downward. Such a bias arises probably because parents tend to spend more for low-performing
siblings than for high-performing siblings within a family.
The over-identi¯cation test suggests that the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators
are not necessarily invalid instruments. The p-value of the test exceeds 0.1 at the bottom of
column (6): the two variables of birth order seem to be uncorrelated with the error term (ui)
16In a quality/quantity model of fertility, the number of siblings is determined simultaneously with the human-
capital investment in the children (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Consequently, if included in (2), the number of
siblings is not likely to be exogenous to ²i. However, failure to control for it may confound birth order e®ects
with sibship size e®ects in (2). Noting the possibility of bias in its estimates, we include the number of siblings
in Xi of (2) as well as (1). Excluding the number of siblings from Xi, however, yields little qualitative di®erence
in results.
17and correctly excluded from the main equation (1). However, failure to reject the hypothesis of
a zero correlation between birth order variables and ui does not necessarily imply that such a
hypothesis is true. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, a potential correlation between birth order
and ui is more likely to overstate the true e®ect of private tutoring than understate it.
Given such a modest e®ect of private tutoring expenditures, it would be instructive to
compare our IV estimates with corresponding estimates of previous studies, precision of the
estimates set apart, in order to gain some perspective of our results. Unfortunately, however,
existing literature on the e®ect of private educational expenditures on test scores is quite scarce.
Thus, we rely on estimates of the e®ect of public school expenditures on student outcomes for
comparison.
In the analysis of a randomization experiment on class size (Project STAR), Krueger (1999,
Table VII) presents that a one student decrease in class size in grades K to 3 leads to a 0.67-0.88
percentile point increase in test score. Evaluated at the mean values of 21 students per class and
51 percentile test score (Appendix Table), these estimates imply a 2.8-3.6 percent improvement
in test score due to a 10 percent decrease in class size and the accompanying 10 percent increase
in per-pupil expenditure.17 Compared with Krueger's (1999) estimates, our estimated e®ect of
private tutoring expenditures is no more than a half.
In terms of earnings in the labor market, Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) summarize that a
10 percent increase in public school spending leads to about a 1-2 percent increase in subsequent
earnings. For example, they report that a reduced-form re-analysis of Card and Krueger (1992)
presents a 1.1 percent increase in weekly earnings associated with a 10 percent reduction in
the average pupil-teacher ratio.18 Other researchers ¯nd slightly weaker e®ects on earnings.
Betts (1995) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in the average teacher-pupil ratio leads to
a 0.4 percent increase in earnings. Grogger (1996) shows that a 10 percent increase in mean
spending per student leads to a 0.7 percent increase in wages. Our estimated e®ect of private
tutoring expenditures is fairly comparable to the estimated e®ects of public school expenditures
on earnings, although ours are on a slightly higher side.
17Krueger (2003, F55-F56) infers that a one percent decrease in class size will be approximately converted into
a one percent increase in annual per pupil cost.
18Our estimated e®ect of tutoring expenditures is dwarfed by a meta-analysis of Hedges et al. (1994) that yields
an estimate that a 10 percent increase in public school expenditure produces an improvement in student perfor-
mance of approximately 0.7 standard deviations. This amount is equivalent to 15.9 percentile point improvement
in test score in our metric. The summary of Hedges et al. (1994) are, however, criticized by Hanushek (1997) for
being biased in favor of large positive e®ects of school expenditures.
186.2 E®ects of Tutoring Hours on Subject Test Scores
In the preceding section we examine the e®ect of tutoring expenditures on a student's test score
that is averaged over three subjects|math, Korean and English. An implicit assumption was
that these three subjects account for the majority of the educational expenditures. In fact,
however, the tutoring expenditures that are reported in KEEP and used by previous regressions
are the monthly average of total expenditures that are paid to all tutoring-related activities for
any academic subject; total tutoring expenditures may include money spent on other subjects
such as social studies and science subjects. As a result, the expenditures may be overstated and
contaminated by measurement errors in an examination that focuses only on math, Korean and
English. To the extent that OLS estimates are biased toward zero under measurement errors,
using total expenditures on tutoring may be a reason for our OLS estimates of the e®ect of
tutoring expenditures being close to zero.
In this section, instead of using undi®erentiated overall expenditures on private tutoring, we
employ information speci¯c to each subject: weekly average tutoring hours and percentile test
scores for each subject. The OLS and IV estimation results for each subject are documented in
Table 3.19 While all the regressions are based on the value-added speci¯cation, odd columns use
only the ¯rst-born indicator as a single IV; even columns use the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born
girl indicators as two IVs. The upper panel shows OLS estimates of the ¯rst-stage regressions,
and the F statistics for examining weak IVs; the lower-panel reports the point estimates of the
e®ect of expenditures that are produced by OLS, 2SLS, LIML and Fuller-k methods, the 95
percent CIs from Wald, AR, LM and CLR tests, and the p-values of the over-identi¯cation tests.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.
For all three subjects, a student's birth order is related to weekly tutoring hours. Degree of
the association, however, varies according to the subject. Whichever variable is used in the ¯rst
stage, birth order is a strong predictor of tutoring hours only for English, and a weak predictor
for math and Korean. First-born students receive about 20 percent greater investments in
English tutoring than later-borns do; the former receive about 14 and 10 percent more tutoring
for math and Korean, respectively, than the latter do. Although the estimates of the ¯rst-born
19As in footnote 11, we convert the raw values of weekly tutoring hours into the natural log metric and multiply
them by 10. To deal with zero hours in the log transformation, a value of 1 is added to every student's raw value
of tutoring hours. When a smaller value (e.g., 0.1) is added instead of 1, the results are qualitatively similar.
19indicators are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, F-statistics for them reveal di®erent degrees of
strength as an IV.
In addition to its potential relevance as an IV, the exogeneity of birth order in the main
equation is supported by the over-identi¯cation test, when two birth order variables are em-
ployed. For all subjects, the test fails to reject the hypothesis of IV exogeneity. Thus, for each
subject birth order seems to serve as a legitimate IV for educational expenditures for a student.
Similar to previous results based on overall expenditures, for all three subjects, the OLS
estimates for the e®ect of tutoring hours show quite a small association between tutoring hours
and test scores. A 10 percent longer tutoring is related to only a 0.03-0.3 percentile point higher
subject test score. When we examine the causal e®ect of tutoring hours, however, di®erent
trends emerge for di®erent subjects.
First, tutoring for math seems to be ine®ective in enhancing the test score. The IV estimates
show a negative impact of math tutoring on the test score, although they are statistically
indistinguishable from a zero e®ect according to robust methods.
Second, tutoring for English seems relatively e®ective in improving the performance. The IV
estimates imply that a 10 percent increase in weekly tutoring hours leads to a 1.3-1.4 percentile
point improvement in the English test score. However, while the LM and CLR tests reject the
null hypothesis of a zero e®ect, the estimated e®ect fails to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero
according to other four robust methods.
Third, it is di±cult to decide whether tutoring for Korean is e®ective in improving the test
score. Although the IV point estimates suggest causal impacts that are larger than for math
and English (i.e., 1.9 to 2.3 points), the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a zero e®ect;
all the 95 percent con¯dence bands include zero. Thus a conservative view will be that tutoring
for Korean does not improve the test score as well.
6.3 Heterogeneity in the E®ect of Private Tutoring
When there is heterogeneity in e®ects, the treatment e®ects that are identi¯ed in an IV analysis is
nothing but local (Local Average Treatment E®ects, LATE). Angrist et al. (1996) show that the
treatment e®ects estimated by 2SLS are applicable only to the group or groups whose behavior is
in°uenced by the instruments (i.e., compliers). Thus the e®ect of private tutoring estimated in
this study does not necessarily represent the average treatment e®ect among students randomly
20chosen in the population, but is valid only for those students whose private tutoring expenditures
are likely to be a®ected by birth order.
Although it is di±cult to distinguish a priori between those students whose tutoring expen-
ditures are likely to be in°uenced by birth order and those that are not, it would be illuminating
to examine whether there exists heterogeneity in e®ects at least along observable dimensions
of student and family characteristics. In addition, previous research suggests that the e®ects
of educational resources may vary according to sex, race, family income and the ability level
of the student (Bedard, 2003; Krueger, 1999; Rivkin et al., 2005). In order to address such
heterogeneity, we disaggregate the main sample by the following three measured dimensions of
students: the level of pre-tutoring performance, sex, and family income. In subsequent empirical
analysis, because of concerns for sample size, we return to the variables that are undi®erentiated
for individual subjects: the monthly average of total tutoring expenditures and the percentile
test scores averaged over math, Korean and English.
6.3.1 Level of Pre-tutoring Performance
At ¯rst, based on the pre-tutoring performance of a student, we split the main sample into three
sub-samples: bottom-third, middle-third and top-third samples. The OLS and IV results for
each sub-sample are documented in Table 4. In this table and subsequent tables, odd columns
are based on the ¯rst-born indicator as a single IV; even columns on the ¯rst-born boy and
¯rst-born girl indicators as two IVs. The upper panel shows OLS estimates of the ¯rst-stage
regressions, and the F statistics for examining weak IVs; the lower-panel reports the point
estimates of the e®ect of expenditures that are produced by OLS, 2SLS, LIML and Fuller-k
methods, the 95 percent CIs from Wald, AR, LM and CLR tests, and the p-values of the
over-identi¯cation tests.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE.
For each third of pre-tutoring performance, the OLS estimates imply a small association
between tutoring expenditures and test scores. A 10 percent larger expenditure on tutoring is
related to only a 0.2 percentile point higher test score. The size of the association varies little
by the level of pre-tutoring performance.
21For students whose pre-tutoring performance is in the bottom third|columns (1) and (2),
birth order has a fairly strong association with tutoring expenditures. Although each of the
dummy variables is individually signi¯cant at the 5 percent level, the ¯rst-born indicator is a
strong IV for tutoring expenditures, but the ¯rst-born boy and ¯rst-born girl indicators are
jointly weak IVs. The IV estimates for the e®ects of private tutoring show modest improvement
in test score due to the increase in tutoring expenditures. A 10 percent increase in spending
raises a low-ability student's test score by a 0.69-0.74 percentile points. Nevertheless, robust
testing methods suggest that private tutoring fails to have signi¯cant e®ects on the performance
of low ability students.
For other students whose pre-tutoring performance is in the middle|columns (3) and (4)|
and top third|columns (5) and (6), birth order fails to be signi¯cantly associated with tutoring
expenditures. Although testing results are not informative because of the weakness of IVs, the
size of IV estimates implies modest improvement in test score due to the increase in tutoring
expenditures. For middle-third students, a 10 percent increase in spending on tutoring raises
the test score by 0.42-0.81 percentile points. For top-third students, a 10 percent increase in
spending enhances the test score by 0.51-0.69 percentile points.
In sum, there seems to exist no substantial heterogeneity in the e®ect of private tutoring
across students of di®erent pre-tutoring abilities; for all levels, private tutoring fails to have
signi¯cant causal e®ects on the test outcome.
6.3.2 Sex
The estimation and testing results for each sex are documented in Table 5. Note that the same
overidenti¯ed model as earlier is not de¯ned in this case. For both male and female students,
birth order signi¯cantly a®ects tutoring expenditures. In both cases, however, birth order fails
to serve as a strong IV.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.
Although point estimates are imprecisely estimated, the IV results show a stronger positive
e®ect of private tutoring for boys than for girls. While a 10 percent larger spending on tutoring
enhances a girl's test score only by 0.12 percentile points, the same amount of spending increases
a boy's score by 0.81-0.94 percentile points. Again, since all of the 95 percent CIs from robust
22methods contain zero for each sex, we fail to ¯nd evidence that tutoring expenditures have
signi¯cant causal e®ects on test outcomes for boys and girls alike.
6.3.3 Family Income
Using the total family income reported in the KEEP data, we split the main sample into three
sub-samples: low-income, mid-income and high-income family samples.20 The estimation results
for each group of family income are presented in Table 6.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE.
Birth order has a strong association with tutoring expenditures only among mid-income
families. In contrast, among low-income and high-income families, ¯rst-born children do not
receive signi¯cantly greater investments in tutoring than later-born siblings; the estimates are
insigni¯cant.
The IV estimates for mid-income students imply that a 10 percent increase in tutoring expen-
ditures leads to 0.37-0.42 percentile point improvement in test score. The size of improvement
seems modest. Again, since all of the 95 percent CIs from robust methods contain zero, we fail
to ¯nd evidence that tutoring expenditures have signi¯cant causal e®ects on the test outcome
for mid-income students.
Although point estimates are imprecisely estimated, the e®ect of tutoring expenditures is
slightly weaker among low-income students than among mid- and high-income students. A
10 percent increase in spending on tutoring either lowers a low-income student's test score or
enhances it by at most 0.06 percentile points; the same increase in spending on tutoring raises
a high-income student's score by 0.63-1.22 points. No such estimates, however, are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. Overall, the causal e®ect of private tutoring expenditures does not seem to
vary substantially according to the family income of a student. In fact, it is close to zero for all
groups of family income.
To summarize, the examination of heterogeneity in e®ects along measurable dimensions of
characteristics reveals no considerable di®erences in the e®ect of tutoring expenditures. Al-
20Total family income includes average monthly labor and ¯nancial incomes of all family members residing
in the household. The low-income families are those whose total monthly income is less than 2 million Won
(approximately $1,675)|the ¯rst (lowest) quartile of the sample distribution of family income. The mid-income
families are those whose total monthly income is between 2 million and 4 million Won ($3,350)|the third quartile
of the sample distribution of family income. The high-income families are those whose monthly income is greater
than or equal to 4 million Won.
23though we ¯nd some di®erences in e®ects between boys and girls, the size of the di®erence in
average e®ects across groups is within the range of statistical errors along all observable dimen-
sions examined; the IV estimates reported in Table 2 do not seem to represent a very narrow
group of students. For all the groups of students identi¯ed by observable characteristics, the
causal e®ect of tutoring expenditures are modest and insigni¯cant.
6.4 Robustness to Missing Test Scores
According to Table 1, about 13.4 percent of students in the main sample do not take CSAT and
hence have no test scores. If test-writing decisions of students are systematically related with
their observable and/or unobservable characteristics, then our IV estimates will be biased due
to a sample-selection problem. To address such a possibility, we estimate a linear probability
model for a student's decision to take CSAT, using the same speci¯cation as in (1) and (2)
except that Yi is replaced by an indicator for no test-writing. The OLS and 2SLS estimation
results for test-writing are shown in Table 7.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE.
The OLS estimate in column (5) suggests that private tutoring expenditures are positively
associated with test-writing decisions. The size of the association, though, is negligible and
indistinguishable from zero. The 2SLS estimates in columns (3) and (4) also suggest no strong
relationship between private tutoring expenditures and test-writing behavior. The estimation
results suggest that missing test scores of some students, which may take place in association
with private tutoring expenditures, are unlikely to cause a serious bias in our IV estimates for
the e®ect of educational expenditures.
In contrast to tutoring expenditures, a student's hours of self-study and pre-tutoring per-
formance signi¯cantly a®ect the decision to take CSAT. Both of the variables are strongly and
positively related with test-writing behavior. These two variables may not be a concern for
the consistency of IV estimates when they are uncorrelated with private tutoring expenditures.
However, it is hard to believe this is so. As long as students who have lower pre-tutoring per-
formance and shorter hours of self-study, hence requiring greater private tutoring expenditures
by their parents, systematically choose not to take the test, the strong correlation between a
24student's hours of self-study, pre-tutoring performance and test-writing decision may yield a
bias in our IV estimates.
Due to the lack of an appropriate variable that explains the selection process, while not
a®ecting one's test score, the Heckman's method for correcting a sample-selection problem is
not well applied in our context. Instead, we attempt to address a potential sample-selection
bias by replacing missing test scores with those that are randomly generated in reference to a
student's pre-tutoring performance.21 When missing test scores are replaced, the causal e®ect
of private tutoring expenditures on performance is more precisely estimated, but remains at the
similar level. For the whole sample, a 10 percent increase in expenditure enhances a student's
performance by 0.8-0.9 percentile points. If the whole sample is divided by the pre-tutoring
performance of a student, the results of the low-ability group are generally similar to those in
Table 4; the estimates of the mid-ability group, however, slightly fall to a 0.05 to 0.1 point level,
but those of the high-ability group rise to a 1.3 to 1.9 point level. Again, these amounts of the
e®ect are relatively modest and statistically insigni¯cant.
7 Potential Explanations for the Modest E®ect
Our main conclusion of the preceding analysis is that private educational expenditures have
modest, if any, causal e®ects on student test performance. Such a ¯nding may be contrary to
expectations of many. Here we review a few potential explanations for the ¯nding.
First, monetary educational investments may not always matter in children's educational
outcomes. Although controversial, some researchers summarize that public school resources are
21The simulation procedures are as follows: When a student's test score is missing while her pre-tutoring
performance is available in the data, we assign a hypothetical test score (Yi) that is randomly generated by the
formula given by:
Yi = ~ Yi + 5 £ Ài (3)
where ~ Yi is i's observed percentile value of the pre-tutoring performance in grade 11, and Ài is a random number
from N(0;1). In order to give a su±cient range of randomness in test score, a factor of 5 is multiplied to Ài.
Next, if both test score and pre-tutoring performance of a student are not available in the data, we employ the
following assignment process:
Yi = ¿i (4)
where ¿i is a random number from a uniform distribution between 0 and 25. The reason for using the range
between 0 and 25 is because Table 7 suggests that those not taking the test are likely to be low-performers than
medium- or high-performers. (Here, we use values of 5 in (3) and 25 in (4) for generating a hypothetical test score
for a student whose test score is unknown. When we employ other values than 5 and 25, however, there are no
substantial qualitative di®erences in the results. The results under di®erent values are available upon request.)
According to the preceding procedures, a total of 235 missing test scores are substituted for. Their average value
and standard deviation are 41.1 and 31.7, respectively.
25not an important determinant of student outcomes. Our main results lend further support to
the claim in light of private educational expenditures.
As a potential explanation about small e®ects of public educational investments, researchers
suggest poor management of educational resources due to large bureaucracies in the public
sector (Anderson et al., 1991) and unionization of public school teachers (Hoxby, 1996). Our
study o®ers an answer to such explanations: private use of educational funds also has no more
signi¯cantly positive impacts on student outcomes than public management does. In Korea most
of private educational institutions such as hakwons are small-sized and non-unionized. Thus
public mis-management due to bureaucracies and unionization is unlikely to be responsible for
small e®ects of public educational expenditures.
Second, in response to the lack of signi¯cant e®ects of public school resources in the U.S.,
researchers pose a possibility that if added resources have diminishing e®ects on student achieve-
ment, current level of public school expenditures may be on the °at portion of the produc-
tion function. The expenditures may be more e®ective at lower levels than at higher levels
(Betts, 1996; Hanushek, 1997). International educational statistics show that South Korea is
placed below median among OECD countries with respect to educational expenditures: OECD
(2004) reports that the educational expenditures per student (private and public in total) of
Korea is 20th largest among 26 OECD countries that have valid statistics. In 2001 Korea spent
$5,159 per student for secondary education, and $8,873 for both primary and secondary ed-
ucation; in contrast, the U.S. spent $8,779 for secondary, and $16,339 for both primary and
secondary education. Educational resources do not seem to be more e®ective at lower levels
than at higher levels.
Third, as shown in section 6.3, birth order is a signi¯cant determinant of private tutoring
expenditure only for the groups of low-performing students and those from mid-income fami-
lies. Thus, our IV estimates are more likely to show the average e®ect of private tutoring for
these groups of students than for other groups. Although we fail to ¯nd strong evidence of
heterogenous e®ects, it is possible that the e®ect of educational investment is weaker among
low-performers than among other higher-performers (e.g., Bedard, 2003). In order to address
heterogeneous e®ects of private tutoring over student quality, we estimate quantile treatment
e®ects using an IV quantile regression (IVQR) method proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen
26(2005).22 (Here we exclude a student's pre-tutoring performance from Xi.) The IVQR re-
sults show stronger e®ects in lower quantiles|1.92 (SE 2.13) for the 0.1 quantile; 0.78 (SE
0.47) for the 0.25 quantile; 0.93 (SE 0.43) for the 0.5 quantile, while weaker e®ects in higher
quantiles|0.47 (SE 0.53) for the 0.75 quantile; 0.45 (SE 0.75) for the 0.9 quantile. Although
the interpretation is limited by the lack of precision of the estimates, it seems unlikely that the
e®ect of private tutoring is larger for the group of higher-performing students.
Fourth, as Hanushek (2003) implies, overall quality of teachers in the private sector may be
responsible for small e®ects of private expenditures. In Korea, full-time public school teachers
are tenured up to 62 years of age and enjoy the same employment bene¯ts as government o±cials.
In addition, school teachers enjoy public respect. In contrast, contracts of hakwon instructors
are usually short-term in nature and fairly unstable as in other private small ¯rms. This will
cause teachers' quality in the private sector to be worse than that in the public sector. To the
extent that teachers' quality can make di®erences in student outcomes, private investment of
educational funds may have small e®ects.
Fifth, peer pressure among parents may explain the lack of the e®ect. According to the
recent theory of group socialization, there are cultural factors in parenting practices, and their
attitudes and beliefs about children; they are shared by parents' peer groups (Harris, 1995;
1998). When private tutoring is a norm in parents' peer groups, the decision to invest in
children's tutoring may not be based on an objective cost-bene¯t analysis; they may be based
on a subjective/cultural belief about the e®ectiveness of private tutoring, or the concern about
their being viewed by the peers as neglectful of children's education. If the decision about
tutoring is based on peer pressure, small e®ects of private tutoring will not be a big surprise.
8 Concluding Remarks
In order to shed light on the e®ectiveness of educational investments on student outcomes, this
paper examines the e®ect of private educational expenditures (private tutoring expenditures in
South Korea) on student standardized test scores. Given that educational expenditures on a
student are not exogenously and randomly determined, the paper exploits that parents favor
a certain-parity child (e.g., ¯rst-born) in educational investments, while the child's academic
22Computer codes for performing IVQR are obtained from the web site \http://www.gsb.uchicago.edu/fac/
christian.hansen /research/." We thank Christian Hansen for sharing the computer codes.
27capability can be little a®ected by birth order in the family.
The analysis of private tutoring expenditures reveals that holding other factors constant,
birth order signi¯cantly in°uences the amount of educational investment received by a student.
The causal estimates based on IV methods imply that a 10 percent increase in expenditure on
private tutoring leads to a 0.56 percentile point improvement in test score. Evaluated at the
mean value, this amount of e®ect is equivalent to a 1.1 percent increase in test score. Given that
a correlation may exist between a student's birth order and performance along the dimensions
that are not revealed by statistical tests, the estimated e®ect is more likely to be the upper limit
of the true e®ect than the lower limit. Nevertheless, our estimated e®ect is fairly comparable
to the e®ects of public school expenditures on earnings estimated by previous studies.
Disaggregating the entire sample by the level of pre-tutoring performance, sex and family
income of students reveals no considerable di®erences in the e®ect of tutoring expenditures.
While there exist di®erences in estimated e®ect between boy and girl students, the size of the
di®erences is within the range of statistical error. As potential explanations for modest e®ects
of private tutoring, we propose lower teacher quality in the private education sector of Korea
and peer pressure of parents. Yet, whether monetary educational investments raise student
educational outcomes in di®erent contexts remains to be further examined.
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